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ABSTRACT
In mobile networks, authentication is a required primitive for
the majority of security protocols. However, an adversary
can track the location of mobile nodes by monitoring pseu-
donyms used for authentication. A frequently proposed so-
lution to protect location privacy suggests that mobile nodes
collectively change their pseudonyms in regions called mix
zones. Because this approach is costly, self-interested mo-
bile nodes might decide not to cooperate and could thus
jeopardize the achievable location privacy. In this paper,
we analyze the non-cooperative behavior of mobile nodes
by using a game-theoretic model, where each player aims at
maximizing its location privacy at a minimum cost. We first
analyze the Nash equilibria in n-player complete information
games. Because mobile nodes in a privacy-sensitive system
do not know their opponents’ payoffs, we then consider in-
complete information games. We establish that symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibria exist with simple threshold strate-
gies in n-player games and derive the equilibrium strategies.
By means of numerical results, we show that mobile nodes
become selfish when the cost of changing pseudonyms is
small, whereas they cooperate more when the cost of chang-
ing pseudonyms increases. Finally, we design a protocol - the
PseudoGame protocol - based on the results of our analysis.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection (e.g., firewalls); C.2.1 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Architecture and
Design—Wireless communication
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Economics, Security, Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks, such as networks of directly com-
municating hand-held devices [1, 2, 3], vehicular networks [31,
56] and delay tolerant networks [20], have brought new se-
curity challenges due to their mobile and infrastructure-less
nature. In particular, in order to verify the identity of com-
municating parties, to revoke misbehaving nodes and to es-
tablish secure associations, ad hoc networks typically require
an authentication feature. To do so, each mobile node is pre-
loaded with an asymmetric key pair and all the messages it
sends are signed with the same private key. As receivers use
the public key of a sender to verify the signature, the public
key is usually sent along with the messages. However, much
to the detriment of privacy, external parties can monitor
public keys to learn the locations of mobile nodes.
Hence, when privacy-conscious nodes authenticate them-
selves to others, they must avoid revealing privacy-sensitive
information. The multiple pseudonym approach [15], sug-
gested in the context of Internet communications, assigns
a set of asymmetric key pairs to every node that are used
alternatively in order to protect their privacy.1 Both indus-
try [4] and academia [7, 9, 37, 43, 50] have adopted this
approach in order to achieve location privacy in mobile ad
hoc networks. A set of pseudonyms is usually preloaded
into mobile devices by an off-line certification authority [51].
Then, over time, mobile nodes change the pseudonyms used
to send messages. To impede an adversary from linking old
and new pseudonyms, a change of pseudonym should be spa-
tially and temporally coordinated among mobile nodes [7].
More specifically, a node cannot free-ride on the pseudonym
change of others to achieve location privacy as its pseudo-
nym can still be tracked. Hence, location privacy is not
achieved by itself but requires a collective effort from neigh-
boring mobile nodes.
The coordination of pseudonym changes has become a
central topic of research with various approaches proposed.
One solution [9] consists in changing pseudonyms periodi-
cally, at a pre-determined frequency. The mechanism works
if at least two mobile nodes change their pseudonyms in
proximity, a condition that is rarely met (as the probability
of a synchronous change is low). Base stations can be used
as coordinators to synchronize pseudonym changes [37], but
this solution requires help from the infrastructure. The ap-
proach in [27] enables mobile nodes to change their pseudo-
1The public key serves as an identifier of the nodes and is
usually referred to as the pseudonym.
nyms at specific time instances (e.g., before associating with
wireless base stations). However, this solution achieves loca-
tion privacy only with respect to the infrastructure. Another
approach [7, 22, 24] coordinates pseudonym changes by forc-
ing mobile nodes to change their pseudonyms within pre-
determined regions called mix zones. This approach however
lacks flexibility because the locations of mix zones are fixed
by a central authority and must be learned by mobile nodes
prior to entering the network. Several researchers advocated
the use of a distributed solution [36, 37, 43], where mobile
nodes coordinate pseudonym changes to dynamically obtain
mix zones. To do this, a mobile node simply broadcasts a
pseudonym change request to its neighbors. This solution
is particularly appealing in mobile ad hoc networks because
it does not require the help of the infrastructure nor prior
knowledge of the location of mix zones.
Nevertheless, the multiple pseudonym approach has draw-
backs that affect the performance of current solutions. First,
a pseudonym change causes considerable overhead, thus re-
ducing networking performance: for example, routing algo-
rithms must update their routing tables [51]. Second, given
the cost of pseudonym generation and management by the
central authority, mobile nodes are usually assigned a lim-
ited number of pseudonyms that can quickly become a scarce
resource if changed frequently. Pseudonyms are thus costly
to acquire and use. Third, mix zones have a cost because
they impose limits on the services available to mobile users:
in order to protect against spatial correlation of location
traces, mix zones can conceal the trajectory of mobile nodes
by not allowing nodes in the mix zone to communicate [36].
Hence, the number of mix zones traversed by mobile nodes
must be kept small. Finally, even if the distributed solution
synchronizes pseudonym changes, it does not align incen-
tives between mobile nodes: because the achieved location
privacy depends on both the node density and the unpre-
dictability of node movements in mix zones [7], a selfish
mobile node might decide to not change its pseudonym in
settings offering low location privacy guarantees.
In contrast with existing approaches, we consider selfish
mobile nodes that locally decide whether to change their
pseudonyms or not. With this paradigm shift, we tackle
one of the main issues that to date has hindered the use
of multiple pseudonym schemes. Although selfish behavior
can reduce the cost of location privacy based on multiple
pseudonyms, it can also jeopardize the welfare achieved with
a location privacy scheme. Hence, we investigate whether
the multiple pseudonym approach achieves location privacy
in non-cooperative scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
investigate the game-theoretic aspects of location privacy
in mobile networks. We propose the first user-centric loca-
tion privacy model to capture the evolution of the location
privacy level of mobile nodes over time. Mobile nodes mea-
sure with the model their location privacy level in order to
determine when to change pseudonyms. We define a game-
theoretic model - the pseudonym change game - that models
the decisions of mobile nodes in a mix zone. We first analyze
the game with complete information (i.e., every node knows
the user-centric location privacy level of other nodes) and
we obtain both pure and mixed Nash equilibria [44]. We
show that nodes should coordinate their strategies: nodes
should either cooperate when there is a sufficient number of
neighbors with low privacy, or defect. Then, because mobile
nodes will in general not have good knowledge of the pay-
offs of other nodes, we study, using a Bayesian approach [30],
the incomplete information scenario. We evaluate both the-
oretically and numerically the game model, and derive the
Bayesian Nash equilibria for a class of threshold strategies
in which nodes decide whether to change their pseudonym
based on comparing their privacy level to a threshold value.
We find a symmetric equilibrium, in which all nodes coop-
erate with the same probability, as determined with respect
to a distribution over privacy levels. We compare the game-
theoretic approach with random and socially-optimal strate-
gies and show that using the Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
players reduce their consumption of pseudonyms while still
achieving high location privacy. Finally, we design the Pseu-
doGame protocol that implements the pseudonym change
game. This paper is part of the recent trend of blending
game theory with security/cryptographic mechanisms when
selfish parties are involved [10, 29, 38, 39, 45, 47].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the state of the art of location privacy and the economics of
privacy. In Section 3, we present the system and threat mod-
els considered throughout the paper. In Section 4, we pro-
pose the user-centric location privacy model. In Section 5,
we present the game model that we then investigate with
complete information in Section 6 and incomplete informa-
tion in Section 7. In Section 8 we describe the pseudonym
change game protocol. We conclude the paper in Section 9.
2. RELATEDWORK
Previous works on location privacy [6, 34, 42] show that
the adversary can implicitly obtain the true identity of the
owner of a mobile node from the analysis of its location. For
example, using location traces collected in an office environ-
ment from the Active Bat system, Beresford and Stajano [6]
correctly identify all participants by simply examining where
the participants spent most of their time. Similarly, using
GPS traces from vehicles, two studies by Hoh et al. [34] and
Krumm [42] find the home (and thus the identity) of most
drivers.
Hence, pseudonyms are not sufficient to protect the loca-
tion privacy of mobile nodes and should be changed over
time to avoid such attacks. But even if location traces
of mobile nodes do not contain any pseudonyms, Hoh and
Gruteser [32] are able to reconstruct the tracks of mobile
nodes using a multiple target tracking (MTT) algorithm.
Hence, location traces should also be altered spatially. In
other words, the spatial and temporal correlation between
successive locations of mobile nodes must be carefully elim-
inated to prevent external parties from compromising their
location privacy. In this paper, location privacy is achieved
by changing pseudonyms in regions called mix zones [6],
where the location of mobile nodes cannot be eavesdropped.
Note that mobile nodes make use of long-term identifiers,
such as MAC (Medium Access Control) addresses, to com-
municate on the data link. For example, in IEEE 802.11,
the MAC addresses are 48-bit values included in frames to
identify the source or destination of a frame. MAC addresses
can be anonymized to serve uniquely for short term commu-
nications. To do so, one approach [27] consists in changing
the MAC address every time a pseudonym is changed. An-
other possibility [26] is to obscure the MAC address and use
an identifier-free link layer protocol.
Similarly, it is possible to identify devices relying on their
distinctive characteristics (i.e., fingerprints) at the physical,
link and application layer. At the physical layer, the wireless
transceiver has a wireless fingerprint that can identify wire-
less devices in the long term using modulation-based tech-
niques [8], transient-based techniques [19], amplitude-based
techniques [53] or a combination of features [28, 46]. How-
ever, these techniques are only evaluated with specific tech-
nologies and countermeasures could be developed. Hence,
in mobile networks, it remains unclear how much identify-
ing information can be extracted from the physical layer. At
the link layer, it is possible to distinguish between a number
of devices and drivers [21]. At the application layer, devices
can also be identified based on clock skews [40]. However,
such techniques require an active adversary and can be coun-
tered by ignoring the requests sent by the adversary. Sim-
ilarly, a reduction of the differences between drivers would
limit the effectiveness of such attacks. Note that indepen-
dently from the presence of fingerprinting attacks, higher
layer privacy mechanisms such as mix zones remain useful.
Some applications may, for example, require keeping loca-
tion traces for a while (e.g., for congestion analysis).
There are several techniques, besides the multiple pseu-
donym approach, to achieve location privacy. Group sig-
natures [16] allow a group member to sign on behalf of a
group without revealing the identity of the signer. The main
drawback of group signatures is that they require a group
manager to add and revoke group members. The size of
the group determines the achieved privacy of its member.
Similarly, Ring signatures [49] allow mobile nodes to sign on
behalf of an ad hoc group of nodes without the help of a
central coordinator. However, the location privacy provided
by ring signatures is still an open problem [23]. Anonymous
credential systems (e.g., Idemix [12]) allow mobile nodes to
anonymously authenticate to third parties, with the help of
an online credential issuer. The online availability of a cre-
dential issuer is often not possible in wireless networks. To
circumvent the issue, techniques based on unclonable iden-
tifiers, such as e-tokens [13], allow nodes to anonymously
authenticate themselves a given number of times per pe-
riod. However, such techniques do not work in the case of a
prolonged absence of the credential issuer.
Game theory has been used to evaluate the strategic be-
havior of mobile nodes in ad hoc networks for node revoca-
tion [47]. It has also been used to study privacy. Acquisti [5]
explores the reasons decentralized anonymity infrastructures
are still not in wide use today. Varian [54] depicts the role
of privacy in economic transactions, showing that because
of the advantages of price discrimination, consumers may be
less inclined to protect their privacy. In this paper, we study
a new aspect of privacy by evaluating how privacy can be
achieved among non-cooperative nodes.
3. PRELIMINARIES
We focus exclusively on peer-to-peer communications be-
tween nodes and do not consider communications with the
infrastructure (such as cellular networks or WLAN).
3.1 System Model
We study a network where mobile nodes are autonomous
entities equipped with WiFi or Bluetooth-enabled devices
that communicate with each other upon coming in range. In
other words, we describe a pervasive communication system
(a mobile ad hoc network) such as a vehicular network [31],
a delay tolerant network [20], or a network of directly com-
municating hand-held devices [1, 2, 3] in which mobile nodes
in proximity automatically exchange information.
As commonly assumed in such networks, we consider an
oﬄine Certification Authority (CA) run by an independent
trusted third party that pre-establishes the credentials for
the devices. In line with the multiple pseudonym approach
to protect location privacy, we assume that prior to entering
the network, every mobile node i registers with the CA that
preloads a set ofM public/private key pairs {Pubki , P rvki }Mk=1
to provide verification and signature functionalities, respec-
tively. Note that the CA verifies the identity of each user
upon registration. A public key Pubki serves as the identifier
of node i and is referred to as its pseudonym. The private
key Prvki enables node i to digitally sign messages, and the
digital certificate validates the signature authenticity.
We consider a discrete time system with initial time t = 0.
At each time step t, mobile nodes move in the network. We
assume that mobile nodes automatically exchange informa-
tion (unbeknownst to their users) as soon as they are in com-
munication range of each other. Note that our evaluation
is independent from the communication protocol. Still, we
align our communication model with common assumptions
of pervasive communication systems: mobile nodes advertise
their presence by periodically broadcasting proximity bea-
cons (e.g., every 100ms over a range of 300m in vehicular
networks) containing the node’s authenticating information
(as well as the position and speed in vehicular networks).
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications,
beacons enable mobile nodes to discover their neighbors.
When a node i receives a beacon, it controls the legitimacy
of the sender by checking the certificate of the public key of
the sender. After this, i verifies the signature of the beacon
message. Subsequently, if confidentiality is required, a se-
curity association is established (e.g., with Diffie-Hellman).
Note that there is ongoing work in the literature [11, 14] to
reduce the cryptographic overhead induced by the process-
ing of all messages.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume that an adversary A aims to track the location
of mobile nodes. We consider that A can have the same cre-
dentials as mobile nodes and is equipped to eavesdrop com-
munications. In practice, the adversary can thus be a rogue
individual, be a set of malicious mobile nodes, or may even
deploy its own infrastructure by placing eavesdropping de-
vices in the network. In the worst case, A obtains complete
coverage and tracks nodes throughout the entire network.
We characterize the latter type of adversary as global.
A collects identifying information (i.e., pseudonyms) from
the entire network and obtains location traces that allow him
to track the location of mobile nodes. Hence, the problem
we tackle in this paper consists in protecting the location
privacy of mobile nodes, that is, in preventing other parties
from learning a node’s past and current location [7]. Finally,
we assume that the key-pair generation and distribution pro-
cess cannot be altered or controlled by the adversary.
4. USER-CENTRIC LOCATION PRIVACY
In this section, we evaluate the amount of location pri-
vacy provided by the use of multiple pseudonyms. We then
propose a user-centric model of location privacy to capture
the location privacy of a node over time.
4.1 Location Privacy
There are several techniques to mitigate the tracking of
mobile nodes, as discussed in the related work Section. In
this paper, we consider the use of multiple pseudonyms: over
time, mobile nodes change the pseudonym to sign messages,
thus reducing their long term linkability. To avoid spatial
correlation of their location, mobile nodes in proximity co-
ordinate pseudonym changes in regions called mix zones. In
order to thwart Sybil attacks, we assume that as soon as a
node changes pseudonyms, the old pseudonym expires and is
removed from the node’s memory. Mix zones can also con-
ceal the trajectory of mobile nodes to protect against the
spatial correlation of location traces, e.g., by using (i) silent
mix zones [36, 43], (ii) a mobile proxy [50], or (iii) regions
where the adversary has no coverage [9]. Without loss of
generality, we assume silent mix zones: mobile nodes turn
off their transceivers and stop sending messages for a certain
period of time. If at least two nodes changing pseudonyms in
a silent mix zone, a mixing of their whereabouts occurs and
the mix zone becomes a confusion point for the adversary.
Consider a mobile network composed of N mobile nodes.
At time t, a group of n(t) mobile nodes are in proximity.
One node among the n(t) nodes can initiate the pseudonym
change using the one-round protocol suggested in [43] (i.e.,
the Swing protocol): a mobile node broadcasts an initiation
message to start the pseudonym change. The n(t)−1 mobile
nodes in proximity receive the message and enter a silent
period during which they decide whether to change their
pseudonyms or not. During the silent period, nodes cannot
observe each other messages. At the end of the silent period,
it appears that all pseudonym changes occur simultaneously.
Mobile nodes must thus decide to change pseudonyms with-
out knowing the decision of other nodes in proximity.
The adversary A observes the set of n(T ) nodes changing
pseudonyms, where T is the time at which the pseudonym
change occurs. A compares the set B of pseudonyms before
the change with the set D of pseudonyms after the change
and, based on the mobility of the nodes, predicts the most
probable matching [7, 43]. Let pd|b = Pr(“Pseudonym d ∈
D corresponds to b ∈ B”), that is the probability that a new
pseudonym d ∈ D corresponds to an old pseudonym b ∈ B.
As is standard in the literature [52], the uncertainty of the
adversary, and thus for our purposes the location privacy
level of node i involved in a successful pseudonym change at
time T , is:
Ai(T ) = −
n(T )X
d=1
pd|b log2(pd|b) (1)
The achievable location privacy depends on both the number
of nodes n(T ) and the unpredictability of their whereabouts
in the mix zone pd|b. If a node i is the only one to change its
pseudonym, then its identity is known to the adversary and
its location privacy level is defined to be Ai(T ) = 0. The
entropy is maximum for a uniform probability distribution
pd|b, which would provide node i with a location privacy
level of log2(n(T )). This can be achieved, for example, after
a coordinated pseudonym change by all players. We denote
T `i the time of the last successful pseudonym change of node
i, i.e. when at least one other node changed its pseudonym.
4.2 User-Centric Model
The entropy metric evaluates the location privacy achieved
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Figure 1: Location privacy loss function βi(t, T
`
i ). At
t1, node i changes pseudonym and updates its time
of last successful pseudonym change: T `i := t1. The
function β(t, T `i ) increases according to the user sen-
sitivity λ and estimates the time at which mobile i
becomes unsatisfied with its location privacy (T fi ).
At t2, node i changes pseudonym again and updates
T `i := t2.
in mix zones of the network. However, the location privacy
needs of individual users vary depending on time and loca-
tion. It is thus desirable to protect the location privacy in
a user-centric manner, such that each user can decide when
and where to protect its location privacy. Hence, we con-
sider a user-centric model of location privacy. User-centric
location privacy [33, 35, 43] is a distributed approach where
each mobile node locally monitors its location privacy level
over time. The user centric approach is easily scalable and
permits a more fine-grained approach to maintaining loca-
tion privacy. Each mobile node can evaluate the distance
over which it is potentially tracked by an adversary (i.e., the
distance-to-confusion [33]) and can act upon it by deciding
whether and when to change its pseudonym. Whereas, a
network wide metric measures average location privacy and
might ignore that some nodes have a low location privacy
level and are traceable for long distances.
With a user-centric model, mobile nodes can request a
pseudonym change from other nodes in proximity when their
local location privacy level is lower than a desired level.
Nodes in proximity will then choose to cooperate when their
location privacy level is low as well. The drawback of the
user-centric model is that nodes may have misaligned incen-
tives (i.e., different privacy levels) and this can lead to failed
attempts to achieve location privacy.
In this work, we formalize this problem and introduce a
user-centric location privacy model to capture the evolu-
tion of user-centric location privacy level over time. The
user-centric location privacy level of each mobile node i
is modeled via a location privacy loss function βi(t, T
`
i ) :
(R+,R+) → R+ where t is the current time and T `i ≤ t is
the time of the last successful pseudonym change of mobile
i. The maximum value of βi(t, T
`
i ) equals the level of loca-
tion privacy achieved at the last pseudonym change. The
privacy loss is initially zero and increases with time accord-
ing to a sensitivity parameter, 0 < λi < 1, which models the
belief of node i about the tracking power of the adversary.
The higher the value of λi, the faster the rate of privacy loss
increase. For simplicity, we consider that λi = λ, ∀i. For a
given T `i , we write:
βi(t, T
`
i ) =

λ · (t− T `i ) for T `i ≤ t < T fi
Ai(T
`
i ) for T
f
i ≤ t
(2)
Table 1: List of symbols.
Symbol Definition
t Time
T `i Time of last successful pseudonym change
Ai(t) Location privacy of node i at time t
βi(t, T
`
i ) Location privacy loss function
λ Location privacy sensitivity
γ Cost of changing pseudonym
T fi Time for which β(t, T
`
i ) is maximum
αi(t, T
`
i ) Counter of wasted pseudonyms
N Total number of nodes in the system
n(t) Number of nodes in transmission range at time t
Pi Player i of the pseudonym change game
pd|b Probability that pseudonym d corresponds to b
ui(t, T`, si, s−i) Payoff function
θi Type of player
f(θi) Probability density function of type
θ˜i Threshold to change type
si Pure-strategy of node i
s−i Pure-strategy of other nodes besides i
nC(s−i) Number of cooperative nodes besides i
Si Space of pure-strategies
SΘi Space of pure-strategies in Bayesian game
where T fi =
Ai(T
`
i )
λ
+ T `i is the time when the function
reaches the maximal privacy loss (i.e., the user-centric lo-
cation privacy is null). Figure 1 illustrates how the function
evolves with time. Given this location privacy loss function,
the user-centric location privacy of node i at time t is:
Ai(t) = Ai(T
`
i )− βi(t, T `i ), t ≥ T `i (3)
Time T fi is the time at which node i’s location privacy will
be zero unless it is successful in changing its pseudonym
at a new confusion point. Based on the time of the last
successful pseudonym change T `i , mobile nodes rationally
estimate when next to change pseudonyms.2 Note that, in
practice, nodes cannot compute Ai(T
`
i ) precisely. Hence,
we consider that nodes use an approximation such as the
upperbound log2(n).
In our model, a node’s location privacy does not accu-
mulate over time. Rather, it depends only on the number
of nodes that cooperate in the last successful pseudonym
change. Moreover, mobile nodes are given the ability to con-
trol the length of path that is revealed to an adversary before
the next pseudonym change. If a mix zone is a strong confu-
sion point (i.e., Ai(T
`
i ) is large), then a node can choose to
reveal a longer distance before changing pseudonym again.
If a mix zone is a weak confusion point, a node can attempt
another pseudonym change as soon as possible. In doing
so, a node has autonomy to control the period of time over
which its location can be tracked. Because the achievable
location privacy defined by Eq. (1) is logarithmic and the
location privacy loss function is linear, the user-centric loca-
tion privacy level will decrease quickly. In our future work,
we plan to analyze the effect of other loss functions (e.g.,
super-linear functions).
5. PSEUDONYM CHANGE GAMES
In this section, we present the game-theoretic aspects of
achieving location privacy with multiple pseudonyms in a
selfish environment. We introduce a game-theoretic model
2In a user-centric model, users are actually not involved: the
devices make decisions on their behalf.
that we refer to as the pseudonym change game G. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the notation used throughout the paper.
Upon receiving a pseudonym change request, mobile nodes
must decide whether to collaborate. The key point of the
game-theoretic analysis is to consider costs and the poten-
tial location privacy gain when making a pseudonym change
decision.
On one hand, pseudonyms are costly to acquire and use
because they are owned in a limited number and require con-
tacting a central authority for refill. Similarly, routing [51]
becomes more difficult and requires frequent updates of rout-
ing tables. In addition, while traversing silent mix zones,
mobile nodes cannot communicate and thus momentarily
lose access to services. We take into account the various
costs involved in changing pseudonym in a parameter γ that
can be expressed as: γ = γacq + γrte + γsil, where γacq is
the cost of acquiring new pseudonyms, γrte is the cost of
updating routing tables, and γsil is the cost of remaining
silent while traversing a mix zone. The cost is expressed in
privacy units (e.g., bits), causing a decrease in the achieved
privacy. Thus, rational mobile nodes might refuse to change
pseudonym in order to reduce their costs. Moreover, selfish
behavior might jeopardize the achievable location privacy.
On the other hand, the available location privacy gain
(upperbounded by the density of nodes and their locations
unpredictability) and the user-centric location privacy level
might encourage selfish mobile nodes to change pseudonym
and obtain a satisfactory location privacy level.
Therefore, using a game-theoretic analysis, we investigate
whether location privacy can emerge in a non-cooperative
system and despite the cost incurred by a node in changing
its pseudonym, differentiated privacy levels, and the need
for coordinated pseudonym changes to achieve a confusion
point. We consider rational mobile nodes that maximize
their payoff function, which depends on the current location
privacy and the associated pseudonym management cost.
5.1 Game Model
Game theory allows for modeling situations of conflict and
for predicting the behavior of participants. In our pseudo-
nym change game G, nodes must decide upon meeting in the
network whether to change pseudonym or not. We model
the pseudonym change game as a static game because mix
zones are silent and thus a node is unable to sense its wider
environment when deciding whether or not to change its
pseudonym. This modeling decision also keeps our analysis
tractable, while conforming to a simple, but game-theoretic,
model of node rationality. The game G is defined as a triplet
(P,S,U), where P is the set of players, S is the set of strate-
gies and U is the set of payoff functions. At any time t,
several games are played in parallel (but nodes participate
in a single game at a time).
• Players: The set of players P = {Pi}n(t)i=1 corresponds to
the set of mobile nodes in transmission range of each other
at time t. For a valid game we require n(t) > 1. We assume
that each node knows the number of other nodes in the mix
zone. To achieve a consensus on this number, each node can
adopt a neighbor discovery protocol [55].
• Strategy: Each player has two moves si: Cooperate (C)
or Defect (D). By cooperating, a mobile node changes its
pseudonym. The set of strategies of node i is thus Si =
{C,D} and the set of strategies in the game is S = {Si}n(t)i=1 .
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Figure 2: Example of pseudonym change. (a) 7 nodes move on the plane (x, y). (b) Evolution of the payoff of
node 1 over time. At t1 (event E1 in (a)), nodes 2, 3, and 4 meet in a mix zone and cooperate with node 1. Their
payoff ui and the time of the last successful pseudonym change are updated: ui = Ai(T
`
i )− γ = log2(4)− γ = 1.8,
and T `i := t1, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The payoff of node 1 then decreases according to β1 with slope λ. At t2 (event E2),
node 1 defects. At t3 (event E3), node 1 cooperates with nodes 6 and 7. Consequently, the 3 nodes update
their payoff and the time of the last successful pseudonym change. At t4, (event E4) node 1 cooperates but
nodes 8 does not. Hence, the payoff of node 1 decreases by γ. Finally, at T f1 = t5, the payoff of node 1 reaches
0 (event E5).
• Payoff Function: We model the payoff function of every
node i as ui(t) = bi(t)−ci(t), where the benefit bi(t) depends
on the level of location privacy of node i at time t, whereas
the cost ci(t) depends on the privacy loss function and the
cost of changing pseudonym at time t. If at least two nodes
change pseudonyms, then each participating node improves
its location privacy for the cost of a pseudonym change γ. If
a node is alone in changing its pseudonym, then it still pays
the cost γ and, in addition, its location privacy continues
to decrease according to the location privacy loss function.
If a node defects, its location privacy continues to decrease
according to its location privacy loss function. Formally, we
have:
If (si = C) ∧ (nC(s−i) > 0),
T `i := t (4)
αi(t, T
`
i ) := 0 (5)
ui(t, T
`
i , C, si) := max (Ai(T
`
i )− γ, u−i − γ) (6)
If (si = C) ∧ (nC(s−i) = 0),
ui(t, T
`
i , C, si) := max (0, u
−
i − γ) (7)
αi(t, T
`
i ) := αi(t, T
`
i ) + 1 (8)
If (si = D),
ui(t, T
`
i , D, si) := max (0, u
−
i ) (9)
where u−i = Ai(T
`
i )− γ − βi(t, T `i )− γαi(t, T `i ) is the payoff
function at time t−, which is the time immediately prior to
t. s−i is the strategy of the other players, and nC(s−i) is
the number of cooperating nodes besides i, and αi(t, T
`
i ) is
the number of pseudonyms wasted by node i since its last
successful pseudonym change T `i . (Note that in contrast
with the equality sign =, the sign := refers to the assignment
of a new value to a variable.)
We can represent the static pseudonym change game in a
normal form. Table 2 shows an example for two players in
power range of each other. Each player has two strategies:
C or D. The value pairs in the cell represent the payoff of
the player 1 and 2, respectively. We assume uii > γ for both
players and can dispense with the max(0, ·) component of
player payoff after an unsuccessful pseudonym change.
Figure 2 (a) shows seven users moving in a network and
playing a total of four pseudonym change games. Table 2
corresponds to the game played in event E3 in Figure 2
(a). Figure 2 (b) illustrates the evolution of the payoff of
node 1 playing the four games. Because we analyze only
a single strategic interaction between players in this paper,
we simplify notation and write n = n(t), βi = βi(t, T
`
i ),
αi = αi(t, T
`
i ), and ui(si, s−i) = ui(t, T
`
i , si, s−i).
• Type: Upon meeting other players, the strategy of a
player depends on its knowledge of its opponent payoff func-
tion. As both the time of the last pseudonym change and the
corresponding location privacy gain are unknown to other
players, each player has incomplete information about its
opponents payoffs. To solve the problem, Harsanyi [25] sug-
gests the introduction of a new player named Nature that
turns an incomplete information game into an imperfect in-
formation game. To do so, Nature assigns a type θi to ev-
ery player i according to a probability density function f(θi)
known to all players, where θi belongs to space of types Θ.
The type of the players captures the private information of
the player, θi = u
−
i , where u
−
i is the payoff to player i at
time t− just prior to the current opportunity to change pseu-
donym. Because γ is common and known to all nodes, this
completely defines the payoff of the node.
5.2 Equilibrium Concepts
In this section, we introduce the game-theoretic concepts
that will help us get an insight into the strategic behavior
of mobile nodes. In a complete information game, a pure-
strategy for player i is si ∈ Si, where Si = {C,D} is the
pure-strategy space. A strategy profile s = {si}ni=1 defines
the set of strategies of the players. Let us write bri(s−i), the
Table 2: Normal form of the two-player pseudonym
change game.
P1\P2 C D
C (A1(T `1 )− γ,A2(T `2 )− γ) (u−1 − γ, u−2 )
D (u−1 , u
−
2 − γ) (u−1 , u−2 )
best response of player i to the opponent’s strategy s−i.
Definition 1. The best response bri(s−i) of player i to
the profile of strategies s−i is a strategy si such that:
bri(s−i) = arg max
si
ui(si, s−i) (10)
If two strategies are mutual best responses to each other,
then no player has the motivation to deviate from the given
strategy profile. This leads us to the concept of Nash Equi-
librium [44].
Definition 2. A strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) if, for each player i:
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si (11)
In other words, in a NE, none of the players can unilaterally
change his strategy to increase his payoff. A player can
also play each of his pure strategies with some probability
using mixed strategies. A mixed strategy xi of player i is a
probability distribution defined over the pure strategies si.
In an incomplete information game, a pure-strategy for
player i is a function s
¯i
: θi → Si where Si = {C,D}.
The pure-strategy space is denoted SΘi . A strategy profile
s
¯
= {s
¯i
}ni=1 is the set of strategies of the players. In incom-
plete information games, the NE concept does not apply as
such because players are unaware of the payoff of their op-
ponents. Instead, we adopt the concept of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium [25, 30]. Consider that Nature assigns a type to
every player according to a common probability distribution
f(θi). Because the type of a player determines its payoff, ev-
ery player computes its best move based on its belief about
the type (and thus the strategy) of its opponents.
Definition 3. A strategy profile s
¯
∗ = {s
¯
∗
i }ni=1 is a pure-
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) if, for each player
i:
s
¯
∗
i (θi) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
X
θ−i
f(θ−i) · ui(si, s
¯
∗
−i(θ−i)), ∀θi (12)
6. ANALYSIS OF COMPLETE INFORMA-
TION GAME
We begin the analysis with a complete information model
called the pseudonym change C-game (C stands for complete
information). Each player with common knowledge about
the type of all players chooses a strategy simultaneously (i.e.
C-game). We obtain NE for the 2-player game, and general-
ize the results for n-player C-games. We consider that upon
a pseudonym change, every node achieves the same level of
privacy and thus we consider the upperbound Ai = log2(k),
where k ≤ n is the number of cooperating nodes.
6.1 2-player C-game
The strategic representation of the two player C-game is
shown in Table 3. Two players P1 and P2, meeting in a
mix zone at time t, take part in a pseudonym change game.
Each mobile node decides independently whether to change
its pseudonym without knowing the decision of its opponent.
The game is played once and the two players make their
moves simultaneously. The value in the cells represents the
payoff of each player. As usual, the players want to maximize
their payoff. We assume here that u−i > γ for both players,
so that u−i −γ > 0. Since u−i is itself bounded from above by
log2(2)− γ = 1− γ in a 2-player game, we require γ < 1/2,
so that the cost is bounded.
Table 3: 2-player C-game.
P1\P2 C D
C (1− γ, 1− γ) (u−1 − γ, u−2 )
D (u−1 , u
−
2 − γ) (u−1 , u−2 )
Each player knows u−−i, i.e. the payoff of the other player
immediately before the game, which is sufficient to define
its payoff for different strategy profiles because the cost γ
is common knowledge. Theorem 1 identifies the potential
equilibrium strategies for the players. The proof is provided
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. The 2-player pseudonym change C-game has
two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (C,C) and (D,D) and one
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (x1, x2) where xi =
γ
1−u−−i
is the probability of cooperation of Pi.
We observe that the pseudonym change game is a coor-
dination game [18] because log2(2) − γ > u−i > u−i − γ.
Coordination games model situations in which all parties
can realize mutual gains, but only by making mutually con-
sistent decisions. Coordination games always have three NE
as obtained with Theorem 1. (C,C) is the Pareto-optimal
strategy and thus the preferred equilibrium. If the probabil-
ity of cooperation xi of each player equals 1, then the mixed
equilibrium equals (C,C). Figure 3 illustrates the best re-
sponse correspondence of the two players. For example, if
both players have a low u−i (meaning a high propensity to co-
operate), the mixed-strategy equilibrium approaches (0, 0).
In such a scenario, the basin of attraction of the (C,C) NE
(i.e., the surface of the rectangle between the mixed NE and
the (C,C) NE) is larger than that of the (D,D) NE. In
other words, (C,C) would be the most likely NE in settings
where players find their best response with an adaptive be-
havior. The complete information pseudonym change game
is asymmetric because the payoff of each player depends on
its private type. For example, the mixing probability is dif-
ferent for each node (i.e., x1 6= x2).
6.2 n-player C-game
We extend the 2-player C-game by considering a set of
n ≤ N players meeting in a mix zone at time t. Each player
has complete information and knows the payoff function u−i
of its n − 1 opponents. Let Ck and Dn−k denote the sets
of k cooperating players and n−k defecting players, respec-
tively. The proofs of lemmas and theorems are provided in
the Appendix. Lemma 1 identifies the existence of an All
Defection NE.
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Figure 3: Best response correspondence for the 2×2
pseudonym change C-game. The best response func-
tion of player P1 is represented by the dashed line;
that of player P2 is represented by the solid one. The
NE are where the two players’ best responses cross.
Lemma 1. The All Defection strategy profile is a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium for the n-player pseudonym change
C-game.
Lemma 2 identifies the existence of a NE with cooperation.
Lemma 2. Let Ck
∗
be a maximal set of cooperating nodes
s.t. ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗ , log2(|Ck
∗ |) − γ > u−i . If there exists such
a Ck
∗
, then the strategy profile s∗ = {s∗i |s∗i = C if Pi ∈
Ck
∗
, s∗i = D if Pi ∈ Dn−k
∗} is the unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium of the n-player pseudonym change C-game,
in which at least two players cooperate.
Considering Lemma 1 and 2, and as there are not any NE
in which only one player cooperates, we immediately have
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The n-player pseudonym change C-game has
at least 1 and at most 2 pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
To illustrate the above results, we consider the set of all
possible strategy profiles in a 3-player C-game. Assume that
N = 10, the payoff of each Pi before playing the game is
in the interval [0, log2(10)− γ], depending on the number of
nodes that have cooperated with Pi in the past (at T
`
i ) as
well as the number of failed attempts and the rate of privacy
loss. The set of all strategy profiles of this 3-player C-game
is: s = {(s1, s2, s3)|si ∈ {C,D}}.
Lemma 1 proves that (D,D,D) is always a NE. From
Lemma 2, (C,D,D), (D,D,C), and (D,C,D) are not NE,
because |Ck∗ | must be strictly larger than 1 to satisfy
log2(|Ck
∗ |) − γ > u−i . Among the remaining strategy
profiles, there might be a single NE as defined by Lemma 2.
The existence of this equilibrium depends on the payoff of
each player. Assume that P3 cooperated with 6 nodes at
T `3 and its payoff is log2(7) − γ − β3 − γα3 that is bigger
than log2(2)−γ before playing the game. Consider that the
payoff of P1 and P2 is less than log2(2) − γ before playing
the game. Then, the NE strategy profile is (C,C,D),
corresponding to |Ck∗ | = 2.
6.3 Discussion
In C-games, each mobile node tries to reduce its consump-
tion of pseudonyms by changing pseudonyms: (i) only when
iθ
iθ? 2log ( )n γ−0
C D
Figure 4: Description of the threshold equilibrium
in the 2-player I-game. There is a threshold θ˜i that
determines the best response of player i.
necessary (i.e., low user-centric location privacy level) and
(ii) when the other encountered nodes are willing to cooper-
ate as well. In the 2-player C-game, we prove the existence
of two pure and one mixed NE. The payoff to both players
in (C,C) is higher than in all other outcomes of the game
and thus (C,C) is pareto-optimal. Because the payoffs in the
n-player scenario are more asymmetric than those of the 2-
player game (i.e., with a larger difference across players), a
NE with cooperation does not always exist. Still, the All
Defection equilibrium always exists because one player can-
not gain by cooperating alone. Moreover, it can be easily
proved that the NE with cooperation is Pareto-optimal, if it
exists.
7. ANALYSIS OF INCOMPLETE INFOR-
MATION GAME
In this section, we consider games of incomplete informa-
tion, which we call I-games (I stands for incomplete infor-
mation): the players do not know the payoff type of their
opponents. The incomplete information assumption better
models the knowledge of mobile nodes. The proofs are pro-
vided in the Appendix.
7.1 Threshold Equilibrium
In an I-game, players decide their move based on their
belief about their opponent’s type. Recall that a player’s
type is defined as θi = Ai−βi−γαi−γ; this defines the payoff
immediately before the game. We establish an equilibrium
in which each player adopts a strategy based on a threshold:
if the type of a player is above a threshold θ˜i, it defects,
otherwise it cooperates. Hence, the space of types is divided
into two regions (Figure 4). A player that has 0 ≤ θi ≤ θ˜i
always cooperates, whereas a player with θ˜i < θi ≤ log2(n)−
γ always defects. With this threshold equilibrium, we define
the probability of cooperation of node i as:
F (θ˜i) = Pr(θi ≤ θ˜i) =
Z θ˜i
0
f(θi)dθi (13)
and 1−F (θ˜i) is the probability of defection. The equilibrium
strategy at BNE of player i, denoted by s
¯
∗ = (θ˜∗1 ; ...; θ˜
∗
n),
depends only on the thresholds. In the next section, we
obtain the threshold equilibrium for the 2-player I-game.
Remark: In identifying a symmetric BNE with threshold
strategies we do not constrain the game so that these are
the only strategies available. Rather, we show that a node’s
best-response is a threshold strategy across all strategies
when every other node plays a threshold strategy; i.e., it
continues to be a best response even if a node can play a
non-threshold strategy, such as playing C for some range of
θi, then D, then C, and then D again.
7.2 2-player I-Game
Each player predicts the type of its opponent based on the
probability distribution f(θi). To determine the threshold
values that define a BNE, fix a threshold strategy s
¯2
associ-
ated with threshold θ˜2 for player 2, and define the average
payoff to player 1 for C and D, given type θ1, as:
E[u1(C, s
¯2
)|θ1] = F (θ˜2)(1− γ) + (1− F (θ˜2)) ·
max(0, (θ1 − γ)) (14)
E[u1(D, s
¯2
)|θ1] = θ1, (15)
and similarly for player 2. A necessary condition for a
threshold equilibrium is that when a player’s type is its
threshold type it is indifferent between C and D. This is
by continuity of payoffs.
So, we can consider the effect of requiring that
E[ui(C, s
¯−i
)|θ˜i] = E[ui(D, s
¯−i
)|θ˜i] for each player i ∈ {1, 2},
directly imposing this condition on the threshold types. This
yields a system of two non-linear equations on the two vari-
ables θ˜1 and θ˜2. The following lemma establishes that this
is also sufficient: solving for thresholds with this property
defines a BNE for the 2-player I-game.
Lemma 3. The threshold strategy profile s∗ = (θ˜∗1 , θ˜
∗
2) is
a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the 2-player,
incomplete information pseudonym change I-game if:(
E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ] = E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ]
E[u2(C, s
¯
∗
1)|θ˜∗2 ] = E[u2(D, s¯
∗
1)|θ˜∗2 ]
(16)
Theorem 3 guarantees the existence and symmetry of the
2-player I-game BNE. As before, we continue to require
γ < 1/2 to make the 2 player game interesting (so that
a player retains non-zero privacy value for more than one
period after a successful pseudonym change.) For stating
the result we assume continuous type distributions, so that
probability density f(θi) > 0 for all θi ∈ [0, 1− γ].
Theorem 3. The 2-player pseudonym change I-game
has All Cooperate and All Defect pure-strategy Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium, and every threshold equilibrium s∗ =
(θ˜∗1 , θ˜
∗
2) is symmetric for continuous type distributions.
In simulations we find an intermediate, symmetric thresh-
old equilibrium in almost all cases, where players don’t sim-
ply always cooperate or always defect.3
To illustrate the results of the theorem we consider the
following example. Consider that the distribution on types
is uniform, with θi ∼ U(0, 1−γ), and cumulative probability
function F (θi) = θi/(1−γ). Looking for an equilibrium with
a threshold, θ˜∗i ≥ γ, so that the max(0, ·) term in defining
the payoff of the cooperation action can be dropped, we can
simplify Eq. (16) and obtain the system of equations:
θ˜∗i , 1− γ
F (θ˜∗−i)
, i = 1, 2 (17)
Imposing symmetry and solving, we obtain (θ˜∗i )
2 − θ˜∗i +
γ(1 − γ) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, which leads to the following
solutions:
θ˜∗i ∈ {γ, 1− γ} (18)
3Note that previous works [17, 48] obtain similar results
showing the existence and symmetry of the BNE for this
type of games (infinite games of incomplete information).
Recall that we assume γ < 1/2, so that γ < 1 − γ.
The solution θ˜∗i = 1 − γ corresponds to an All Coopera-
tion BNE because θi ≤ 1− γ in a two player game. Looking
at the intermediate equilibrium when θ˜∗i = γ, we see that
E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ1] = F (θ˜∗2)(1 − γ) + (1 − F (θ˜∗2)) · 0 = θ˜∗2 = θ˜∗1
while E[u1(D, s
¯
∗
2)|θ1) = θ1, and can confirm that C is the
best response for θ1 < θ˜
∗
1 and D is the best response for
θ1 > θ˜
∗
1 . By further analysis of Eq. (16) for the case of
θ˜∗i < γ, there are a multiplicity of symmetric threshold equi-
librium in this problem, for any θ˜∗1 = θ˜
∗
2 < γ, including
(s
¯
∗
1, s¯
∗
2) = (0, 0) which is the All Defection BNE. These re-
sults are in line with Theorem 3.
We numerically solve Eq. (16) to find symmetric thresh-
old equilibrium for three different probability distributions
(using fsolve() in Matlab). We consider the beta distribu-
tion B(a, b), a family of continuous probability distributions
defined on the interval [0, 1] and parameterized by two pos-
itive shape parameters a and b. If θ ∼ B(2, 5), nodes have a
small θ with a high probability (i.e., long-tail distribution),
whereas with θ ∼ B(5, 2), nodes have a large θ with a high
probability. If θ ∼ B(2, 2), θ is symmetric and centralized
around 0.5. Figure 5 shows the BNE θ˜∗i and the related
probability of cooperation F (θ˜∗i ) as a function of the cost
γ. For each distribution of type, we obtain three BNE: θ˜∗i,1
is an All Defection equilibrium, θ˜∗i,2 is an intermediate equi-
librium, and θ˜∗i,3 is an All Cooperation equilibrium. With
the BNE θ˜∗i,1 and θ˜
∗
i,3, nodes always play the same strategy.
With θ˜∗i,2, we observe that as γ increases, the probability of
cooperation F (θ˜∗i,2) increases as well, indicating that players
should cooperate more when the cost of changing pseudo-
nyms increases. In other words, with a high γ, users care
more about the coordination success with others. If γ is
small, then the cooperation success becomes less important
and nodes become selfish.
The probability of cooperation also depends on the type of
Beta distribution. With a lower type distributions B(2, 5),
the probability of cooperation at equilibrium is smaller than
other distribution types. In other words, selfish nodes coop-
erate less because whenever they must change pseudonym,
they know that the majority of their neighbors also needs
to change pseudonym. On the contrary, for B(5, 2), selfish
nodes cooperate more to maintain high privacy.
Table 4: Welfare of system E[ui], fraction of inter-
actions in which a pseudonym is changed (FC), and
fraction of successful coordinations (CS).
Strategy
E[ui] | FC | CS
B(2, 5) B(2, 2) B(5, 2)
θ˜∗i,2, γ = 0.3 0.20|0.08|0.84 0.39|0.44|0.50 0.56|0.70|0.58
θ˜∗i,2, γ = 0.5 0.15|0.09|0.85 0.29|0.49|0.50 0.46|0.91|0.85
θ˜∗i,2, γ = 0.7 0.09|0.08|0.85 0.17|0.49|0.49 0.28|0.91|0.85
Random (1− γ)/2 | 0.5 | 0.5
Socially Opt. 1− γ | 1 | 1
In considering the welfare achieved in the pseudonym
change game, we focus on the performance under the in-
termediate BNE θ˜∗i,2. This is more interesting to study than
the All Cooperation or All Defection equilibrium. We sim-
ulate the 2-player I-game in Matlab. The results are aver-
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Figure 5: Probability distribution of user types f(θ), threshold θ˜∗i , and probability of cooperation F (θ˜
∗
i ) at
the equilibrium as a function of γ for different distributions of type: β(2, 5), β(2, 2), and β(5, 2). For each type
distribution, there are three BNE: θ˜∗i,1 corresponds to All Defection, θ˜
∗
i,3 to All Cooperation, and θ˜
∗
i,2 is an
intermediate equilibrium. As the cost γ of changing pseudonyms increases, θ˜∗2 approaches θ˜
∗
1 , meaning that
the probability of cooperation increases.
aged over 1000 simulations. We consider three metrics: (i)
the welfare of the system defined as the average achieved
utility, E[ui] of the nodes; (ii) the fraction of interactions in
which a pseudonym is changed FC; and (iii) the fraction of
successful coordination between nodes, CS (i.e., nodes play
the same action). We compare the BNE performance with
a random strategy, in which all nodes choose their threshold
randomly, and to the socially-optimal strategy, which is All
Cooperation.
We observe that the welfare achieved in the BNE is less
than with the socially-optimal strategy and in general simi-
lar to that of the random strategy. The difference with the
random strategy is particularly large for B(5, 2) because the
probability of cooperation is then larger than that of the
random strategy. It is informative to consider the ratio of
welfare in the BNE with that at the socially-optimal, by
analogy to the price of anarchy (which considers the perfor-
mance of the worst-case NE [41]). This ratio provides a mea-
sure of the cost of non-cooperative behavior. For example
in Table 4 for B(5, 2) and γ = 0.3, we have 0.56/0.70 = 0.80
meaning that the system performance is degraded by 20%.
We notice that the system performance is only degraded by
7% in the case of γ = 0.7, showing that nodes are less self-
ish when the cost of a pseudonym change is large. The cost
FC in Table 4 shows the fraction of interactions in which
a pseudonym is changed. We observe that in general less
pseudonyms are changed with θ˜∗i,2 (20% decrease with re-
spect to the random strategy when γ = 0.3) showing that
less pseudonyms are needed.
7.3 n-player I-Game
Assume n ≤ N players meet at time t and take part in a
pseudonym change I-game. Let Pr(K = k) be the probabil-
ity that k nodes cooperate. We can again obtain the thresh-
olds that define a BNE in the n-player game by comparing
the average payoff of cooperation with that of defection, now
defined as:
E[ui(C, s
¯−i
)] =
n−1X
k=0
Pr(K = k)ui(C, s
¯−i
)
E[ui(D, s
¯−i
)] = u−i
By a similar argument to that for the 2-player I-game
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Figure 6: Threshold θ˜∗i at the equilibrium as a function of n for different values of γ and distributions of type:
β(2, 5), β(2, 2), and β(5, 2). For each type distribution, the number of BNE changes depending on the cost γ.
(Lemma 3), a BNE s
¯
∗ = (θ˜∗1 ; · · · ; θ˜∗n) can be obtained as
the solution to the following system of n non-linear equations
for the n variables θ˜i:
n−1X
k=0
Pr(K = k)ui(C, s
¯−i
) = u−i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n (19)
We denote the probability of cooperation qi = F (θ˜i).
Assume that the thresholds θ˜∗i are all equal: We obtain
qi = q and thus have a symmetric equilibrium. Conse-
quently, the probability that k nodes cooperate is Pr(K =
k) =
`
n
k
´
qk(1−q)n−k. For example, consider the limit values
of q:
• If q → 0, then θ˜∗i = 0, Pr(K > 0) = 0 and Pr(K =
0) = 1. Thus, the All Defection equilibrium exists.
• If q → 1, then θ˜∗i = 1, Pr(K < n−1) = 0 and Pr(K =
n − 1) = 1. Thus, the All Cooperation equilibrium
occurs when log2(n)− γ > u−i for all nodes i.
For intermediate values of q, we numerically derive the
thresholds θ˜∗i by solving Eq. (19) with Matlab (Figure 6).
For γ = 0.3, we observe that with a higher density of nodes
n, θ˜∗i,2 decreases, which means that players cooperate with a
lower probability. Similarly, θ˜∗i,3 disappears for large values
of n, which means that Always Cooperation is not a BNE
anymore. Yet in the case of β(5, 2), the All Cooperation
equilibrium θ˜∗i,4 persists. The reason is that with such a dis-
tribution of types, selfish nodes need to cooperate more. For
a larger value γ = 0.7, we observe a similar behavior. Note
that with β(5, 2) an additional threshold equilibrium, de-
noted by θ˜∗i,3, appears in which nodes cooperate more when
n increases. Moreover, All Cooperation equilibrium survives
longer when γ increases.
7.4 Discussion
In summary, in I-games, we first prove analytically the
existence and symmetry of BNE in 2-player games and then
obtain numerically three BNE for each possible distribution
of type. We observe that the intermediate BNE θ˜∗i,2 re-
duces the number of pseudonyms used (FC in Table 4) and
achieves a high level of privacy. However, non-cooperative
behavior affects the achievable location privacy. In partic-
ular, we notice that a larger n encourages selfish nodes to
not cooperate (Figure 6). In contrast, when the cost γ of
changing pseudonym is large, we observe that selfish nodes
cooperate more, which means that a high cost of pseudo-
nyms provides an incentive to cooperate. In summary, even
with incomplete information, it is possible to find an equi-
librium that achieves high location privacy, and reduces the
number of used pseudonyms.
8. LOCATION PRIVACY PROTOCOL
As discussed in Section 4, several mobile nodes can coor-
dinate a pseudonym change with the Swing protocol [43].
In the Swing protocol, any node can start the pseudo-
nym change by broadcasting an initiation message. Usually,
nodes changing speed and/or direction will initiate the pro-
tocol if there is at least another node in proximity. Mobile
nodes receiving the initiation message stop communicating
for a silent period defined in the initiation message and de-
cide whether to change pseudonym.
In the Swing protocol, the decision of mobile nodes (to
cooperate or not) exclusively depends on their user-centric
level of location privacy compared to a fixed threshold. In
other words, the cost of changing pseudonym and the prob-
ability of cooperation of the neighbors are not considered.
Our game-theoretic evaluation allows us to design a more
sophisticated protocol - the PseudoGame protocol - that ex-
tends the Swing protocol to consider optimal strategies of
mobile nodes in a non-cooperative environment. The Pseu-
doGame protocol is based on our results for n-player I-games
in Section 7.
Similar to [43], we assume that mobile nodes move in the
network with speed in the range [s
¯min
, s
¯max
]. The nodes
can choose a silent period in the range [spmin, spmax]. The
duration of the silent period is attached to the initiation
message. When a node is expected to change its velocity
within spmax time steps, the node sends the initiation mes-
sage and the PseudoGame protocol is started. It lasts at
most (spmax + 1) time steps.
All nodes in proximity that receive the initiation message
use the PseudoGame protocol if the authenticity of the initia-
tion message is verified. Their decision to change pseudonym
is influenced by the number of neighbors and their probabil-
ity of cooperation (related to the distribution of user types
f(θi)). As described in Protocol 1 for any node i, the Pseu-
doGame protocol assists mobile nodes in selecting the BNE
strategy. In summary, after receiving the initiation message,
the nodes calculate the equilibrium thresholds using their
location privacy level, the estimated number of neighbors,
and their belief f(θi). The PseudoGame protocol extends
the Swing protocol by computing the optimal threshold to
determine when to change pseudonym.
Protocol 1 PseudoGame.
Require: Node i knows the probability distribution f(θ)
Require: The current location privacy of node i is u−i
1: if (Change of velocity within spmax) & (At least one
neighbor) then
2: Broadcast initiation message to change pseudonym.
3: Goto 6
4: else
5: if (Receive Initiation message) & (message is valid) then
6: n⇐ estimate(n) //Number of neighbors
7: Calculate θ˜∗i as solution ofPn−1
k=0 Pr(K = k)ui(C, s¯−i
)− u−i = 0 wrt θ˜i,
where Pr(K = k)⇐ `n
k
´
qk(1− q)n−k and
q ⇐ R θ˜i0 f(θi)dθi
8: if u−i ≤ θ˜∗i then
9: Play C
10: Comply with silent period spmax
11: else
12: Play D
13: else
14: Keep pseudonym
9. CONCLUSION
We have considered the problem of selfishness in location
privacy schemes based on pseudonym changes. We have
introduced a user-centric model of location privacy to mea-
sure the evolution of location privacy over time. To evaluate
the strategic behavior of mobile nodes, we have proposed
a game-theoretic model, the pseudonym change game. We
first analyze the n-player scenario with complete informa-
tion and obtaine NE strategy profiles. Then, using Bayesian
game theory, we investigate the equilibria in the incomplete
information game and derive the equilibrium strategies for
each node. In other words, we have derived equilibria to
achieve location privacy in a non-cooperative environment.
A particularly interesting result is that when the cost of
pseudonyms is large, selfish nodes care more about the suc-
cessful unfolding of the game and thus improve the achiev-
able location privacy in the system. This work is the first
step towards a deeper understanding of the effect of non-
cooperative behavior in location privacy schemes. For future
work, we intend to evaluate our model in realistic mobile
scenarios and measure the achievable location privacy.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. We first prove the existence of the pure-strategy
NE. (C,C) is a NE since 1 − γ > u−i for i = 1, 2. Sim-
ilarly (D,D) is a NE because u−i > u
−
i − γ for i = 1, 2.
For the mixed strategy NE, let xi denote the probability of
cooperation of ui. The average payoff of player 1 is:
u1(x1, x2) = x1x2(1− γ) + x1(1− x2)(u−1 − γ)
+(1− x1)x2u−1 + (1− x1)(1− x2)u−1
= x1x2(1− u−1 )− γx1 + u−1
The payoff is maximized for:
∂
∂x1
u1(x1, x2) = x2(1− u−1 )− γ = 0
which gives x2 =
γ
1−u−1
and by symmetry x1 =
γ
1−u−2
.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. All Defection is a NE, because if any player Pi
unilaterally deviates from D and cooperates, then its payoff
is equal to u−i − γ, which is always smaller than its payoff
of defection u−i .
C. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. First, if any Pi ∈ Ck∗ unilaterally deviates from
cooperation to defect, then its payoff u−i is smaller than
log2(|Ck
∗ |)−γ. Now let Dn−k∗ be the set of all nodes except
those in Ck
∗
. As Ck
∗
is the largest group of nodes where
log2(|Ck
∗ |)−γ > u−i , no mobile node in Dn−k
∗
can increase
its payoff by joining the set of nodes in Ck
∗
. Hence, none
of the nodes can unilaterally change its strategy to increase
its payoff and s
¯
∗ is a NE when |Ck∗ | > 1. We show by
contradiction that the equilibrium is unique. Consider Ck
∗
1
and Ck
∗
2 such that ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗j , log2(|Ck
∗
j |) − γ > u−i for
j = 1, 2. There always exists a Ck
∗
= Ck
∗
1 ∪ Ck∗2 such that
∀Pi ∈ Ck∗ , log2(|Ck
∗
1 |+|Ck∗2 |)−γ > u−i because log2(|Ck
∗
1 |+
|Ck∗2 |) > log2(|Ck
∗
j |) for j = 1, 2 and users will merge to the
larger group of Ck
∗
. Thus s
¯
∗ is the unique NE.
D. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. Fix player 2’s strategy to threshold θ˜∗2 and con-
sider player 1 with type θ1 < θ˜
∗
1 . We have E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ] =
E[u1(D, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ]. Now, E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ] − E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ1] =
θ˜∗1 − θ1 ≥ (1 − F (θ˜∗2))(θ˜∗1 − θ1) ≥ E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ] −
E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ1], where the first inequality follows because
F (θ˜∗2) ≥ 0. Therefore, the drop in payoff from D rela-
tive to with type θ˜∗1 is at least that from C and a best-
response for the player is to play C. Now consider player
1 with type θ1 > θ˜
∗
1 . By a similar argument, we have
E[u1(D, s
¯
∗
2)|θ1]−E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ] = θ1−θ˜∗1 ≥ (1−F (θ˜∗2))(θ1−
θ˜∗1) ≥ E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ1] − E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 ], and the increase in
payoff for D is greater than the increase in utility for C and
the player’s best response is to play D.
E. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. To see that All Defection is a BNE with thresh-
olds θ˜∗1 = θ˜
∗
2 = 0, simply note that E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 0] =
0 = E[u1(D, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 0] and appeal to Lemma 3. Simi-
larly, to see that All Cooperation is a BNE consider thresh-
olds θ˜∗1 = θ˜
∗
2 = 1 − γ, for which F (θ˜∗1) = F (θ˜∗2) = 1 since
θi ∈ [0, 1− γ]. With this, we have E[u1(C, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 1− γ] =
1− γ = E[u1(D, s
¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 1− γ].
Second, we prove by contradiction the symmetry of any
threshold equilibrium. Assume without loss of generality
that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium s
¯
∗
2 = (θ˜1; θ˜2),
such that θ˜1 = θ˜2 + , where  is a strictly positive number.
Adopt short hand F for F (θ˜∗2) and F for F (θ˜
∗
2 + ). Then,
for this to be a BNE we require by Eq. (19) that
F · (1− γ) + (1− F ) max(0, θ˜∗2 + − γ)− θ˜∗2 −  = 0 (20)
F · (1− γ) + (1− F) max(0, θ˜∗2 − γ)− θ˜∗2 = 0 (21)
Three cases can be identified considering the values of θ˜2,
, and γ.
(Case 1) θ˜∗2 ≤ γ − . By equating Eq. (20) and (21) and
simplification, we have
F (1− γ)−  = F · (1− γ) (22)
⇒  = F · (1− γ)− F · (1− γ) < 0, (23)
since F > F because the type distribution is continuous
with f(θi) > 0 everywhere. This is a contradiction.
(Case 2) γ −  < θ˜∗2 < γ. By equating Eq. (20) and (21)
and simplification, we have
F · (1− θ˜∗2)+θ˜∗2 − γ − F = F · (1− γ) (24)
⇒  = F · (1− θ˜
∗
2)− F · (1− γ)− (γ − θ˜∗2)
F
(25)
Now, we have F · (1 − θ˜∗2) − F · (1 − γ) < F · (1 − θ˜∗2) −
F · (1− γ) = F · (γ− θ˜∗2) < γ− θ˜∗2 , where the first inequality
follows because F > F and the second inequality because
θ˜∗2 < γ, by assumption of this case. From this it follows that
 < 0 since F > 0, and a contradiction.
(Case 3) γ ≤ θ˜∗2 . By equating Eq. (20) and (21) and
simplification, we have
F · (1− θ˜∗2)− F = F · (1− θ˜∗2) (26)
⇒  = F · (1− θ˜
∗
2)− F · (1− θ˜∗2)
F
< 0, (27)
where the inequality holds because F < F. This is a con-
tradiction.
